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Abstract
This article introduces the special issue by going beyond the traditional debates 
about geopolitics and great power rivalry. Instead, it examines the emergent and 
highly complex world of Central Eurasia, in its transformative effort to reorder itself 
in response to both global and local change. In particular, the paper (and the volume) 
focuses on two interrelated themes: one of a changing Russia, that is anxiously try-
ing to adapt to the uncertain dynamics within and beyond the wider Eurasian space; 
and the other—of an emerging complexity of new order-making regional (integra-
tion) initiatives that are poised to reshape the future of international and global 
order. The overarching intention of this paper and the volume is to advance the need 
to focus on ‘the local’, to gain a more holistic understanding of the present-day chal-
lenges and the kind of global response needed to stay attuned to the increasingly 
complex world.
Keywords Russia · Central Eurasia · Order · ‘the local’ · Complexity · China · EU
This special issue flows from an academic workshop of the same name held at LSE IDEAS in 
December 2018, co-organized by the EU H2020 UPTAKE and the GCRF COMPASS projects.
 * Elena Korosteleva 
 E.Korosteleva@kent.ac.uk
 Zachary Paikin 
 paikin.zach@gmail.com
1 University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
 E. Korosteleva, Z. Paikin 
Introduction to special issue of International Politics
The years since the onset of the Ukraine crisis have seen Russia’s increasing effort 
to deepen its strategic partnership with China and accelerate its declared ‘pivot to 
the East’: As Viacheslav Nikonov, Duma parliamentarian and a founder of Russkiy 
Mir, poignantly noted, Europe was only mentioned once at the 2019 International 
Economic Forum in St Petersburg.1 These developments follow a quarter-century 
of rising disputes between Russia and the West that were nonetheless characterized 
by a nominal commitment to construct some sort of ‘Greater Europe’ from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok rooted in common economic, political, security and cultural spaces. 
The Euromaidan protests saw Ukraine caught between two competing deals and 
regulatory orders—put forward respectively by the European Union (EU) and the 
fledgling Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—that were ultimately not reconciled. 
Ukraine has since placed itself on a path of ‘Europeanization’ and Western inte-
gration, concluding an Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU while enshrining its desire to join NATO 
and the EU in its national constitution.2
This process has coincided with the launch of Moscow’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ ini-
tiative, which officially seeks to promote pan-Eurasian integration without sacrific-
ing Russia’s sovereign decision-making or notional equality in international affairs 
(Karaganov 2016; Trenin 2019a). This split between Russia and Ukraine, which 
were largely part of a single polity for several centuries, leaves the former’s Euro-
pean future and the boundaries of its national community uncertain. Furthermore, it 
is also associated with an invisible ‘loyalty’ rupture and a deepening crisis of rela-
tions between Russia and its immediate neighbourhood manifest in the recent dis-
putes with Belarus regarding the future of the Union State,3 Azerbaijan’s reluctance 
to engage Russia in its connectivity talks with China and the EU, or Uzbekistan’s 
sudden decision to forgo EAEU membership, settling on observer status instead.4 
Russia has thus been left stranded to a certain extent between East and West in an 
era of supercontinent-wide integration projects—ranging from China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) to the EU’s Asia connectivity strategy.
The above dynamics also need to be situated in the context of deep and pervasive 
change observable regionally and globally, including China being on the cusp of 
global influence and, some would argue, global disaster owed the coronavirus out-
break5; the Trump administration becoming more erratic after the president’s acquit-
tal by the Senate in his impeachment trial; and the EU finding itself at a crossroads 
of history in a post-Brexit environment with new (centrifugal) internal and external 
2 https ://eeas.europ a.eu/headq uarte rs/headq uarte rs-homep age/4081/eu-ukrai ne-relat ions-facts heet_en.
3 https ://www.ecfr.eu/artic le/comme ntary _unset tled_union _the_futur e_of_the_belar us_russi a_relat ionsh 
ip.
4 For the full text see President Mirzoyiev’s nation state address on 24 January 2020 visit: https ://presi 
dent.uz/en/lists /view/3324.
5 See the Economist (2020) ‘Special Report on China’s Belt and Road’, 8 February, pp. 1–12.
1 For more information see Nikonov’s opening speech at the Minsk Dialogue forum 2019: https ://www.
youtu be.com/watch ?v=MpizB gRzwP g.
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power dynamics. The overarching picture is that of turmoil, growing uncertainty 
and complexity, which the EU’s Global Security Strategy back in 2016 described 
as ‘predictable unpredictability’ (EEAS 2016) occurring in a world of increasing 
contestation between the established liberal and newly emerging (potentially rival) 
orders (Flockhart 2016).
Our ambition in this special issue is to take stock of these complex developments 
and go beyond the existing debates that traditionally focus on geopolitics and great 
power rivalry so well-rehearsed in the mainstream scholarship over the past cen-
tury. Instead, we wish to take our discussion a step further and look at the future 
of the emergent and highly complex world of Central Eurasia,6 that is reordering 
itself to respond better to both global and local change, in a shared effort of (re-)
learning to cooperate and cohabitate. In particular, we will focus on two interrelated 
themes, to conceptualize a more holistic understanding of the emerging challenges: 
one of a changing Russia, that is anxiously trying to adapt to the uncertain dynam-
ics within and beyond the wider Eurasian space, and sitting awkwardly, once more 
between east and west, while defining its own future; and the other—of an emerging 
complexity of new order-making regional (integration) initiatives that are poised to 
reshape the future of international and global order. The overarching argument this 
special issue seeks to advance is that of the need to drill into ‘the local’ and domes-
tic, to gain a more holistic picture of the present-day challenges and the global gov-
ernance response needed to stay better attuned to the increasingly multiplex (Acha-
rya 2017) and multi-order (Flockhart 2016) world.
The special issue is a result of ongoing research and debates between and beyond 
the contributors to this volume working on the aforementioned themes. It stems from 
discussions held at conferences and workshops, including at LSE IDEAS7 brought 
together by two projects—the H2020 UPTAKE and GCRF COMPASS8; the GCRF 
COMPASS BRI @5 workshop held at Kent and Cambridge9; and especially the 
GCRF signature conference on Governance and Resilience in wider Eurasia, held in 
July 2019, which brought together scholars from Europe, China, Russia, and Central 
Asia, to reflect the developments across an increasingly central Eurasian space.10
This introduction will proceed by unpacking the two core themes of the volume—
a changing Russia, between east and west once more; and a rising Eurasia, shaping 
a new cooperative order(s) and global futures, to be followed by a brief account of 
individual contributions to explicate the analysis further.
6 While the geography of Central Eurasia is discussed later in the text, here we specially refer to the 
space spanning the borders of Europe in the west, Russia in the east, and China in the South.
7 For more information see https ://resea rch.kent.ac.uk/globa l-europ e-centr e/2018/12/13/russi a-betwe en-
east-and-west-and-the-futur e-of-euras ian-order /.
8 For more information on UPTAKE see https ://www.uptak e.ut.ee/; and on GCRF-COMPASS—https ://
resea rch.kent.ac.uk/gcrf-compa ss.
9 https ://resea rch.kent.ac.uk/gcrf-compa ss/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/sites /169/2019/02/COMPA SS-BRI-works 
hop-Short er-draft -progr amme-for-websi te.pdf.
10 https ://resea rch.kent.ac.uk/gcrf-compa ss/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/sites /169/2019/11/COMPA SS-Signa 
ture-Confe rence -2019-Final -24-June.pdf.
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A changing Russia, stranded between east and west, once more?
Russia’s desire to ‘join’ Europe has taken various forms throughout history. 
Most notably, following the ‘gathering of the Russian lands’ that occurred after 
the throwing off of the Mongol yoke, Tsar Peter the Great set the country on a 
path of perceived modernization and Europeanization, including the transfer of 
the national capital to St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland. According to most 
conventional narratives, Russia had been fully incorporated into the European 
balance of power system by the mid-eighteenth century, around the time of the 
Seven Years’ War (Watson 1984:70–71; Kissinger 2014:31–59). However, one 
should not confuse this expression of Europeanness with a desire for uniformity, 
as the desire to ‘catch up’ with the West at times owed more to a pressing need 
to modernize militarily and technologically rather than adopt Western political 
values (Watson 1984:63; Porter 1996:125–127). Russia’s situation at Europe’s 
periphery renders its relationship with the continent complex. It has competed for 
some time with—among other varied intellectual tendencies such as nationalism 
and pan-Slavism—a strain of Eurasianist thinking that has emphasized Russia’s 
distinctness from Europe, although this has taken differing forms: highlighting 
the need for a partnership with China or to defend a distinct Eurasian space sepa-
rate from the rest of Asia from China; embracing Russia’s multi-ethnic character 
or rejecting it in favour of more explicit leadership by ethnic Russians (Laruelle 
2017:156). There has also been speculation as to whether Eurasianism can suc-
ceed as a cultural model or ideal on a par with the appeal of European civilization 
(Rozman 2014:202).
This tug of war between Europhile and Eurosceptic tendencies in Russian poli-
tics and foreign policy has played out over the past several centuries. The end of 
the Cold War was expected to presage Russia’s ‘return to Europe’ after having 
been cut off for several decades by the Iron Curtain. And although various dis-
putes emerged over the norms and practices that should underpin the global and 
European orders (Stent 2014; Hill 2019), even after the Ukraine crisis Russia has 
been keen to stress that the EAEU and its vision of a ‘Greater Eurasia’ aim to be 
complementary to both the EU and the global liberal trading architecture (Kara-
ganov 2016; Sakwa 2017:147–150). Vladimir Putin entered the Kremlin at the 
start of the century aiming to repair much of the relationship with the West that 
had been damaged after the NATO intervention in Kosovo but has presided over 
a period in which this relationship has further deteriorated. As such, much of the 
rhetoric he has employed has sought to balance between support for and criticism 
of norms, values and institutions that are traditionally associated with the West 
and with the so-called ‘liberal international order’ (Zagorski 2008:47; Malinova 
2012:77–82).
The situation is further complicated by the effects resulting from the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union. It is often forgotten that the agreements and dynam-
ics that brought the Cold War to an end occurred before the USSR’s collapse. 
Notions surrounding a declared Russian ‘sphere of privileged interests’ and ‘near 
abroad’ suggest that Moscow had not fully internalized the implications of the 
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Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s. The precise meaning of the non-
Russian republics’ sovereignty and independence was not immediately obvious 
(Plokhy 2015), and it wasn’t until after the start of the war in the eastern Donbass 
that the ‘loss’ of Ukraine became to a certain extent clear (Trenin 2018). As such, 
for the first time in several centuries, post-Maidan Russia is ‘just’ Russia (Trenin 
2019b).
The partial shift in Russian foreign policy away from Europe towards an empha-
sis on Eurasia has been accompanied by changes in Russian domestic politics as 
well. While Russia’s political system does not resemble the Leninist institutions of 
China, shared authoritarian concerns and scepticism surrounding ‘colour revolu-
tions’ has acted as a lubricant in facilitating a normative rapprochement in Sino-
Russian relations in opposition to Western interventionism and democracy promo-
tion (Paikin et al. 2019). Perhaps more crucially, it has become increasingly clear as 
the twenty-first century has progressed that Russia has not been able—and perhaps 
even will not be able—to transform itself into a capitalist liberal democracy on a 
par with Western states. This has been illustrated by references to ‘Putinomics’, a 
form of economics that embraces elements of the free market without transforming 
Russia into a full-fledged market economy, as well as through Putin’s alleged desire 
to ‘build an alternative’ to the Western economic and political consensus (Baunov 
2018). Recent constitutional moves to strengthen the Russian Duma at the expense 
of the presidency could be interpreted as efforts by Putin to strengthen the resilience 
of the current system’s political institutions, having acknowledged that a complete 
transition to a Western-type set-up is not possible. This builds upon Putin’s now-
infamous recent comment that liberalism has become ‘obsolete’ (Barber and Foy 
2019), perhaps more reflective of the frustration felt by many in the Russian elite 
surrounding their country’s inability to join the West than of the populist challenge 
currently being faced in many Western societies (Liik 2019). Moreover, even if the 
Russian political system does undergo a profound change beyond the expiration 
of Putin’s current presidential term in 2024, it could be that China has become too 
powerful and the Sino-Russian relationship too developed for Moscow to turn its 
back on Beijing and fully ‘return to Europe’, as it were. This will particularly remain 
the case so long as rival visions prevail with respect to how to order the wider Euro-
pean space, with Western capitals’ insistence on the right of Eastern European states 
to choose their geopolitical orientation remaining seemingly incompatible with 
Moscow’s proclaimed desire for an ‘equal relationship’ with the West.
As such, Russia remains seemingly stranded between East and West, unable to 
capitalize on its natural synergies with Europe but likely reduced to second-tier sta-
tus in the emerging Asia–Pacific security system (Kortunov 2019). And yet, despite 
the growth of Eurasianism in contemporary Russian political discourse, the notion of 
Europe and the broader West as representing Russia’s perennial ‘Other’ image remains 
strong, with some scholars going so far as to posit a ‘subaltern’ normative-discursive 
dependency (Morozov 2015). As a result, while it might be contended that political 
and values-related differences between Russia and Western Europe will impede the 
development of an intimate or ‘convergent’ international relationship between them 
(Buzan 2012:38–45), it may be Russia’s simultaneous illiberalism and Europeanness 
that represents the driving force in the Russia-Europe split rather than any emergent 
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Eurasianism. In other words, Russia’s contention that it belongs to the European ‘fam-
ily of nations’ without upholding the liberal principles enshrined in the Paris Charter 
of 1990—often thought of as the document that ended the Cold War and launched 
a vision of a Europe ‘whole and free’—inherently challenges the Western European 
notion of what it means to be European. This adds an additional layer of complexity 
underpinning Russia’s ambiguous position between East and West, and the resulting 
ideational contestation that it has produced ensures that the principles underpinning the 
fledgling pan-Eurasian order will remain a matter of contention.
The result of all this is, in many ways, an uncertain and novel picture: Russia 
remains somewhat influenced by the liberalism and Westernism of the 1990s even 
as it gradually adopts a more conservative and populist discourse rooted in ‘strong 
social and patriotic rhetoric […] family, order, [and] spirituality’ (Stoyanova 2019); 
a country with a lengthy history but nonetheless a fresh polity forced to chart a new 
path. Even the various orientations to which Russia is prone—liberal, Eurasianist, 
etc.—can take multiple forms (Sergunin 2004). The country’s accelerated ‘pivot to 
the East’ is also multifaceted and perhaps the most serious attempt that Moscow has 
made in the post-Cold War era to engage deeply with Asia and Eurasia (Lo 2019). 
Its grand projects vary greatly in nature, from the geographically bounded EAEU to 
the more expansive vision of a Greater Eurasian partnership from Lisbon to Shang-
hai. There is a nominal desire to pursue integration across the board and relations 
with China in particular are deepening on both economic and security issues, but the 
recently signed trade agreement between the EAEU and China is non-preferential, 
suggesting a more cautious approach. And although Russia’s sprawling geography 
gives it the ability to project power into a whole host of regions, its interests vary 
from place to place—the regular reminder that Central Asia lies within Russia’s tra-
ditional sphere of influence contrasts sharply with Moscow’s more restrained behav-
iour and rhetoric in the Far East and Northeast Asia.
While the desire to be treated as an equal great power has been a recurring theme 
for Russia in the post-Cold War era, the initial desire to create a ‘Greater Europe’ 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok and the more recent deepening strategic partnership 
with China together indicate that the EAEU alone is insufficient to guarantee Mos-
cow continued great power status at the global level over the long term. Still, the 
ability to project (at the very least) disruptive power with great efficacy demon-
strates that Russia retains the ability to impact the shape of order across much of 
Eurasia, from Europe, to the Middle East, to Central Asia and beyond. The articles 
in this special issue aim to contribute to the conceptualization of the nature of Rus-
sia’s impact on the evolving (perhaps, in some ways, fledgling) Eurasian order as the 
country continues along its extended period of transition, reflecting on the past and 
present to provide a potentially clearer picture of the future.
A rising Eurasia and the future of regional and global orders
This focus on Eurasia in particular owes itself to recent developments that have been 
accumulating over the past several years and decades. While the relative importance 
of dominating the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ has long been a concern of geopolitics, 
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focus on the challenges facing the so-called ‘liberal international order’ has hitherto 
caused much analysis to be focused on the global level (see for example, Ikenberry 
2018; Acharya 2018; Lebow 2018; Buzan and Schouenborg 2018; Reus-Smit and 
Dunne 2017; Sørenson 2016). And while questions surrounding the rise of regional-
ism have featured prominently in the field of international relations since the end 
of the Cold War, the gradual redefinition of Washington’s global role—taking its 
fullest form thus far under the Trump administration—and the late rise of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus (as a gateway to the Middle East) suggest that the future 
of the Eurasian supercontinent may lie, to a large extent, in the hands of its indig-
enous (and yet previously neglected) actors, and a need to shift to the local level, to 
understand better the emergent ordering dynamics there. It is instructive to observe 
how the microcosm of domestic relations and their external projections by local 
actors—e.g. Kazakhstan as evidenced in Pieper’s article, or Azerbaijan as referred 
to by Valiyev et al., or indeed the EAEU difficult integration dynamics as discussed 
by Korosteleva and Petrova in this volume—impact the hitherto seemingly ‘stable’ 
great powers’ status-quo vis-à-vis the region. Notably, Russia’s recent assertiveness 
has emphatically coincided with the perceived further consolidation of the European 
Union and its extended outreach to the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ following the 
launch of a new EU Strategy towards Central Asia,11 as well as with the initiation 
of China’s BRI effectively targeting the same space.12 And while much of the EU’s 
continued dependence on American security guarantees may alter the shape of Eura-
sian integration, the launch of the EU’s Asian connectivity strategy indicates a will-
ingness to respond in some form to China’s entreaties, even if the norms and stand-
ards surrounding these projects may remain a matter of contestation, as argued by 
Lukin, Paikin and Nitoiu et al. in this volume. To this end, the EU Global Security 
Strategy (2016) explicitly reflected on the need to develop cooperative orders across 
the region and beyond; and yet, it proves difficult to put it to practice as posited 
by Korosteleva and Petrova in this special issue. Furthermore, Sakwa’s contention 
(2016, and in this volume) that a ‘clash between norms and spatiality’—between 
clashing regulatory and political orders and the reality of countries’ geographic 
location—was largely to blame for the onset of the Ukraine crisis may suggest that 
a focus on ‘spatiality’ and the role of indigenous and (order-making) actors in shap-
ing that space is imperative, with implications for understanding international and 
global orders.
Engaging with this new imaginary of Eurasia brings the need to redefine the 
term Central Eurasia as a new emergent ordering locality, with a global appeal. 
This special issue treats the Eurasian space as an evolving construct consisting 
of several ‘nested’ identities, which was reflected by a series of contributions to 
this volume. The space has been traditionally viewed as a rough location where 
Eurasia’s three principle powers—the EU, Russia and China—and other actors 
11 https ://www.consi lium.europ a.eu/en/press /press -relea ses/2019/06/17/centr al-asia-counc il-adopt s-a-
new-eu-strat egy-for-the-regio n/.
12 China is now working on the launch of BRI 2.0 to specifically promote the ‘people-to-people’ dimen-
sion. See Korosteleva & Petrova article in this volume.
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are jockeying for material and normative influence. It is in this broad region 
where the Russian-backed EAEU is attempting to consolidate its presence, and 
also where several of the corridors of the BRI connecting Asian and European 
markets lie. It is defined by a mixture of collaboration and contestation between 
actors, ranging from the nominal promise made by Russia and China to harmo-
nize and coordinate the EAEU and BRI projects, to the EU’s cautious embrace 
of the BRI so long as it adheres to a list of economic, environmental and other 
standards.
At the same time, the translation of this globality of wider EU-Asia interaction 
into the locality of many powerful and still emergent actors has begun to shape 
and challenge the status quo of the traditional space for great power politics. And 
although much of the future of global affairs will also be determined by events in the 
‘Indo-Pacific’ or Asia–Pacific or indeed African regions, the confluence of the emer-
gent indigenous players in Central Eurasia—all of which are in transition in various 
ways—on issues such as transport, institutions, security, culture, religion and the 
philosophy of being (hamsoya, meaning life in the shadow of your neighbour)—that 
comes to designate this region as a composition of smaller entities forming a system 
of a rising collective ‘player’, with many voices, aiming to affect the superconti-
nent-wide and global equilibrium. It is in this locality that many contributions of 
the volume view Central Eurasia—as a region roughly spanning Belarus in the west, 
Afghanistan in the south, and Mongolia in the east—an immensely rich space, a 
configuration of domestic politics, and intra- and inter-regional dynamics, presently 
contested by the EU, Russia and China, that comes to set its own voice and ordering 
arrangements.
This is why discussing the future of Eurasian order(s) requires one to engage with 
both ‘the local’ as well as what constitutes an international and even global order, 
as argued by Haukkala’s and Paikin’s articles in this volume. Lebow (2018:305–306) 
defines order as ‘legible, predictable behaviour in accord with recognized norms’ 
that requires a degree of solidarity to remain robust. From an English School per-
spective, an international order can range from mere patterns of behaviour to an 
integral component upholding the stability of an international society of states 
(Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017:31–33). On the other hand, order could also be viewed 
as a very local effort to turn hitherto fragmented communities into powerful ‘peo-
plehood’, making them more ambitious in a strife for good life and resilient in the 
face of adversity, drawing on their ‘inner strength’ and future aspirations (Korostel-
eva and Flockhart 2020). This kind of ‘local order’, if shared through cultural affin-
ity, language, religion and philosophy of being, could challenge any geographical 
border (especially in a nomad culture), and shape the future of Eurasia in another, 
bottom-up and potentially more sustainable way.
This wide range of definitions is useful, as the term ‘order’ could be interpreted 
as requiring stability or alternatively as merely representing the status quo at any 
given time. Tang, for example, argued that order, if anything, should be defined as a 
‘degree of predictability of what is going on within a social system’ (Tang 2016:32). 
This certainly makes sense, when applied to local dynamics within the complex sys-
tem of Eurasia, to understand what is likely to emerge in the future as part of the 
Eurasian space.
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In other words, as this volume attests to through its various contributions—exam-
ining the emergence and reshaping of Eurasia, bottom-up, horizontally through 
various integration initiatives, and top-down via the still dominant great power 
politics—contestation is now an essential and constitutive part of any order and its 
maintenance. What matters is to stay attuned to internal dynamics and be responsive 
to change in an adaptive way (Flockhart 2020) which would necessitate not just the 
emergence but cohabitation of new orders, to be potentially hosted by a complex 
Eurasian space. With contestation between the EU and Russia in the eastern neigh-
bourhood having become particularly apparent in recent years, contrasting with the 
mixed rapprochement and joint Sino-Russian attempts at regional stabilization in 
Central Asia, exploring the foundations of the existing and emergent order(s)—par-
ticularly in Central Eurasia—has become an important and timely task. This debate 
over contestation and order juxtaposes itself with questions surrounding the nature 
and facets of resilience in the international order, covered by several articles in this 
issue as well. These questions are particularly of conceptual interest, as they shed 
light on how processes of change affecting an international order can—perhaps 
counterintuitively—indicate elements of its robustness, durability and strength.
Contributions to the special issue
Individual contributions to this special issue are structured in a particular way to 
expand the conceptual debate that currently surrounds the nature of order—be it 
local, regional or global—and the role of traditional great power politics in it. On 
the other hand, many contributions focus on empirical dynamics and local response, 
to demonstrate how traditionally understood power politics is challenged today by 
the emergent complexity and the increasing unpredictability of global politics. What 
makes this volume special is the richness of its outlook, and the coherence of the 
message posited to the reader—of the need to be responsive to change, both in prac-
tice and thinking, in order to be able to imagine a more sustainable future, of diverse 
and cooperative orders. This special issue challenges the traditional conceptual 
undertakings and brings together a critique of historical, political and IR debates, 
with a focus on Central Eurasia, and its present (re)ordering, with local and global 
implications.
To provide some initial context surrounding Russia’s place in the post-Cold War 
order, the volume begins with Sakwa’s discussion of the country’s complex relation-
ship with the West, further developing the notion advanced in his 2017 book that 
Russia is neither a status quo power nor a revisionist one but rather ‘neo-revisionist’, 
challenging the perceived excesses of the Western-led liberal international order but 
defending the integrity and autonomy of global international society. In particular, 
Vladimir Putin’s recent comment to the effect that liberalism has become ‘obsolete’ 
has raised questions concerning whether Moscow has now set out to create an alter-
native to the Western model and is challenging the existing global order outright. 
Sakwa notes that Putin’s critique contains both a cultural and a geopolitical element, 
and that the opposition is not to the liberal order per se but rather to the notion that 
the spread of liberal order can be equated with the spread of order full stop. This 
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places Russia in an ambiguous conceptual position between east and west as it con-
tinues to chart its post-Cold War identity.
The special issue continues with three analyses that seek to provide further specif-
ics of Russia’s current situation between east and west. Lukin and Paikin in two sep-
arate articles focus on the specifics of the Sino-Russian relationship and the extent to 
which the two countries can forge a deep and durable partnership. Lukin focuses on 
the prospects of a Sino-Russian alliance and delves into the areas of Eurasia where 
Moscow and Beijing possess intersecting interests, while Paikin revisits the Eng-
lish School theory to posit the extent to which Russia and China are jointly able to 
construct a ‘thick’ regional international society in Central Eurasia. Haukkala, for 
his part, turns towards Europe, allowing this special issue to provide a more fully 
rounded discussion of some of the central regional systems within the emerging 
pan-Eurasian order. The conclusions that he reaches surrounding Europe’s possible 
‘nonpolarity’—i.e. the inability of powers to uphold regional order collectively—
provide further illustration of one of this special issue’s central themes, namely an 
exploration of the extent to which cooperative orders are possible in wider Eurasia.
This is followed by two articles that delve into this conceptual question. Korost-
eleva and Petrova examine dynamics related to power, principles and practice to 
evaluate the projects and posture of the EU, Russia and China vis-à-vis the Central 
Eurasian region. While acknowledging that each of these leading powers has been 
reflective to a certain extent when it comes to their respective regional strategies, 
they all too often attempt to project their own norms and priorities onto local actors 
without sufficient consideration for indigenous interests and needs. This, in turn, 
brings implications for the (un)likely resilience of regional order(s) in Central Eura-
sia and the potency of the cooperative great power relations across the region. Nitoiu 
and Pasatoiu, complementing this analysis, proceed to compare the Russian, Indian 
and Chinese interpretations of resilience with that of the EU, which featured the 
concept prominently in its 2016 Global Strategy. In particular, the non-Western view 
of order as dynamic provides for a differing understanding from the Western notion 
that the ‘liberal content’ of today’s global order must be upheld. Finally, the vol-
ume concludes with two case studies examining how some of the region’s smaller 
states self-identify and view their complex interests when faced with the entreat-
ies of the various leading actors from across Eurasia—Pieper providing an analy-
sis of Kazakhstan, and Valiyev and Bilalova examining Azerbaijan. Both articles 
showcase an almost impossible balancing act that many indigenous actors face today 
across Central Eurasia when having to withstand the pressure and assertiveness of 
new integration initiatives, while pursuing their own interests and ‘good life’ aspira-
tions. Paradoxically, this pressure helps them to develop their distinctive Self and 
encourage self-reliance, which, if not recognized and engaged with, may work to 
counter the very integration initiatives that great power politics instigates.
This special issue raises many important conceptual questions that speak directly 
to the world of emergent complexity and ordering dynamics, and to how we under-
stand them in International Relations as a discipline. We hope that by unpacking 
the issues of order, sovereignty, great power politics, global/local nexus, resilience, 
complexity and change in this volume, not only do we substantively contribute to 
the new debates about the future of international order(s) and the place of Russia 
Russia between east and west, and the future of Eurasian order 
and indigenous actors in it, but also aim to draw attention to the immediate rele-
vance and essentiality of ‘the local’ and ‘the person’ in defining these orders in their 
future configuration and resilience. This is what makes Central Eurasia perhaps one 
of the most interesting cases to observe today—as situated at a crossroads of history, 
culture, the Silk Road legacy and its effervescent and almost Sogdian13 adaptability. 
However, as is always the case, we must acknowledge that there seem to be more 
questions asked than answers provided at this point of time. Perhaps the most we 
can hope to achieve in this special issue is a critical appraisal of change and adapt-
ability in Central Eurasia, illuminating the scope of ongoing transformations at both 
the local and global levels. We hope that together the contributions can move the 
field towards more productive and specific engagement with ‘order’ and ‘locality’, 
as well as global and local processes, that would enrich and reshape our understand-
ing of a broad range of issues that are of key importance to the IR discipline and to 
the real world in which we live.
In other words, with this discussion we hope to generate the kind of debate that 
will lead us to a better understanding of the need for a cooperative future, in a world 
of growing complexity and diminishing control, where the only constant that ever 
remains is ‘the person’ and their (re)ordering response to change.
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